States with Section 1332 Waivers to operate high-risk pools (HRPs) or reinsurance programs can receive federal pass through funds equal to reductions in federal expenditures generated by the Waiver. Shifting financial responsibility for high-cost individuals out of the Health Insurance Exchange (HIX) markets is expected to reduce federal expenditures for Advanced Premium Tax Credits, by reducing HIX plan premiums. Simulation models predict that a new HRP or reinsurance program would trigger premium reductions ranging from 7% to 23%. These models assume that insurers do not adjust plan cost-sharing requirements or plan generosity. However, federal requirements specifying the Medical Loss Ratio and plan Actuarial Values give insurers incentives to make multidimensional adjustments. We use plan level fixed effects to generate difference-in-difference estimates of insurer responses to closures of state-operated HRPs during 2014-2016. Silver plan premiums increased 7.7%, deductibles increased 41%, and Maximum-Out-Of-Pocket (MOOPs) expenditures increased 24% following closure of a state HRP.
Impacts of shifting responsibility for high-cost individuals on Health Insurance Exchange plan premiums and cost-sharing provisions

Introduction
Concerns about Health Insurance Exchange (HIX) market stability have generated renewed interest in strategies for shifting financial responsibility for unusually high-cost individuals out of the HIX markets. The impact of this shift on HIX plan premiums could be substantial. The 2016
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data indicates that 2% of people under age 65 accounted for 36% of the total dollars spent by privately insured non-elderly individuals (MEPS 2016) . Removing the most-expensive 2% of non-elderly individuals from the 2016 data reduces average healthcare expenditures by 35%, from $3486 to $2250. This shift would not necessarily reduce total expenditures, but it could potentially increase HIX participation by reducing health plan premiums and cost-sharing requirements. It could also enhance market stability, as states adjust to the repeal of the individual health insurance mandate, beginning in 2019 1 .
States may apply for waivers authorized under Section 1332 of the Affordable Care Act (ACA), to shift this risk from HIX insurers to high-risk pools (HRPs) or reinsurance programs (RPs) (DHHS 2017) . States with approved Section 1332 waivers to operate one of these riskshifting mechanisms (RSMs) would receive pass-through funds equal to RSM-generated reductions in federal expenditures for Advanced Premium Tax Credits (APTC). By the end of 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) had approved waivers permitting three states (Alaska, Minnesota, and Oregon) to establish RSMs. By mid-2018, the governors of four additional states signed laws requiring the state to apply for a waiver to create an RSM (Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, and Wisconsin), and a similar law was passed in Colorado and sent to the Governor. Bills had been filed in six additional states, to initiate the process (NCSL 2018 , SHADAC 2018 , KFF 2017 individuals following ex-post identification of those individuals. The distinction between the two types of RSMs is increasingly blurred as analysts consider hybrids such as "invisible HRPs" that would utilize ex-ante identification of high-risk individuals, but continue to deliver insurance services through the HIX plan.
Actuarial analyses included in the three approved waiver applications predict premium reductions ranging from 7% to 23% of current levels in those states, and a Milliman report predicts potential premium reductions ranging from 19% to 31% of current premium levels 2 (Alaska 2016 , Minnesota 2017 , Oregon 2017 , Ely, Murawski and Thompson 2017 . These predictions are based on simulation exercises that develop actuarial analyses of the impacts of the change in RSM status on expected insurer expenditures, and then use these results to predict changes in plan premiums under the assumption that insurers do not adjust plan cost-sharing (CS) requirements or levels of plan generosity.
Conceptually, however, insurer responses to a change in RSM status could be multidimensional: insurers could adjust premiums, cost-sharing provisions, and/or plan coverage details such as the extent of the provider network, coverage for out-of-network care, numbers of covered therapy visits or breadth of the prescription drug formulary. The composition of insurer responses may be shaped by competitive strategies and by federal requirements. Constraints imposed by the federal Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) requirement and Actuarial Value (AV) requirements give insurers incentives to adjust cost-sharing provisions and plan coverage details, while the constraint imposed by the federally-specified ceiling for plan Maximum-Out-of-Pocket (MOOP) expenditures may limit the extent to which insurers are able to adjust some cost-sharing provisions.
The composition of insurer responses to a change in RSM status is important from two perspectives. For states with approved 1332 Waivers, federal pass-through payments will be inversely related to the extent to which insurers substitute increased plan generosity for reductions in premiums. In addition, the composition of insurer responses to changes in RSM status will affect individuals who purchase insurance through the HIX market. These estimates fall at the lower end of the range indicated by the actuarial simulation models. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, the actuarial models assume that insurers will respond to changes in RSM status by simply adjusting plan premiums; however, we show that insurers also adjust plan CS requirements and we provide suggestive evidence of adjustments to plan generosity. Second, the actuarial models are based on the assumption that new RSMs will focus on individuals with high health risk or high healthcare expenditures;
however eligibility for the traditional state HRPs varied widely (NASCHIP 2011) . Depending on the state, groups eligible for pre-2014 state HRP coverage included:
• "Medically-eligible" individuals with high-cost conditions,
• "Medicare-eligible" individuals who qualified for Medicare before age 65 due to disabilities and were seeking supplemental coverage,
• "HIPAA-eligible" individuals with previous group coverage, and
• "Health Coverage Tax Credit (HCTC)-eligible" individuals who became unemployed due to trade-related events.
Thus, the average medical risk for individuals covered through these early state HRPs was lower than the expected medical risk for individuals likely to be covered under the new RSMs created under Section 1332 waivers. Estimation of the HIX premium impacts of closing these early state HRPs therefore provides a lower-bound estimate of the expected impacts of opening new state HRPs that focus on shifting risk out of the HIX markets.
In addition to the premium increases, we estimate a 40.6% increase in Silver plan deductibles, and a 24.4% increase in Silver plan MOOPs. However, the impacts of HRP closures on deductibles and MOOPs for plans offered in other metal categories are smaller, and they are not consistently positive and significant.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a conceptual framework for considering the impacts of three federal requirements on plan premiums and costsharing provisions. We describe the data, variable definitions and descriptive statistics in Section III. In Section IV, we outline the analytical strategy and provide an indirect test of the parallel trends hypothesis. We present the results in Section V, and the potential limitations and conclusions in Section VI.
Conceptual Framework
Insurers' responses to changes in RSM status are constrained by the MLR and AV requirements, and the maximum allowed level of MOOP. For individual plans, the MLR requirement mandates that plan expenditures for medical claims (Med_Claims) and quality improvement activities (QI) must account for at least 80% of premium revenue. Given that the AV represents the portion of covered claims that must be paid by the insurer, the MLR requirement implies:
where:
• _ ( , ℎ_ ), which represents covered medical claims, is an increasing function of the generosity of the insurance plan ( ), and a decreasing function of the average health status of the insured population ( ℎ_ ),
• encompasses plan coverage details such as the extent of the provider network, coverage for out-of-network care, numbers of covered therapy visits or breadth of the prescription drug formulary,
• represents insurer expenditures for quality improvement activities, and
• _ represents revenue from premiums paid to the insurer, which is equal to the plan premium multiplied by the number of insured individuals.
A state's decision to close an RSM would increase the probability that an insurance plan would bear financial responsibility for one or more high-cost individuals, thereby increasing the expected value of expenditures incurred by the plan. If the MLR requirement was initially binding, the increase in expected expenditures would boost the plan's MLR above 0.80. Insurers could restore the MLR to the initial level by either increasing the plan premium or reducing plan generosity.
The Actuarial Value (AV) requirements specify the portion of covered expenditures that must be paid by the insurer. The AV must be at least 90% for Platinum plans, 80% for Gold plans, 70% for Silver plans, and 60% for Bronze plans payments (DHHS 2013). The AV for Catastrophic plans 5 is approximately 57% (Claxton et al., 2013) . Covered expenditures that are not paid by the plan must be paid by the insured individuals, as specified by the plan's CS provisions; hence the sum of the percentage of claims paid by the plan (AV) and the percentage paid by individuals (denoted here as ) must be equal to 100.
The percentage of covered claims paid by individuals varies across the set of individuals covered under any given plan:
5 Catastrophic plans can only be purchased by individuals who are younger than age 30 or demonstrate a hardship.
• For individuals with medical claim expenditures below the plan deductible (denoted here as type-1 individuals), CS payments are equal to 100% of medical claims expenditures.
• Individuals with claims above the plan deductible pay the deductible plus a portion of covered claims above that level up to the plan's MOOP. For these individuals, the ratio of CS payments to medical claims expenditures decreases as claims expenditures increase.
For individuals with expenditures slightly higher than the plan deductible (denoted here as type-2 individuals), CS payments, as a percentage of covered expenditures, will be greater than (100-AV).
• CS, as a percentage of covered expenditures, could fall below (100-AV) for individuals with high covered expenditures (denoted here as type-3 individuals), because the plan MOOP caps the level of CS payments.
In this simplified example, the plan cost-sharing percentage ( ) is the weighted average of the cost-sharing ratios for the three categories of individuals:
where,
• ���� is the actual plan AV (i) Any changes in the cost-sharing requirements were made to maintain the initial AV after unanticipated changes in the cost or utilization of medical care;
(ii) The plan covers most of the same service area and maintains most of the same provider network;
(iii) Additional modifications were made solely to comply with changes in federal or state requirements.
Despite these constraints, year-to-year changes occur within plans that use the same plan ID in consecutive years. This is consistent with the fact that changes in CS provisions may be required after changes in RSM status, to maintain compliance with AV and MLR requirements.
This plan-level dataset is an unbalanced panel, with substantial rates of plan entry and exit.
For example, the number of Silver plans offered in states with complete data was 4393 in 2014.
This number increased dramatically over the next two years to 9617, and then declined to 4631 plans offered in 2017 (see Panel A of Table 1 ). We also observe considerable turnover among the plans offered in each year: only 32% of plans offered in 2014 were still offered in 2017 (see Panel B of Table 1 ). Finally, the numbers of choices offered to the residents of specific RatingAreas fluctuated dramatically (see Panel C of Table 1 ). In 2014, the number of Silver plans offered to 50-year-old non-smokers was at least 20 in only 32% of Rating-Areas. Individuals selecting HIX plans enjoyed a wider array of choices in 2015 and 2016: insurers in three-fourths of Rating-Areas offered at least 20 Silver plans during these years. In 2017, however, the proportion of Rating-Areas with at least 20 Silver plans dropped back to 32%. The average Silver plan premium offered to 50-year-old non-smokers was $479. For comparison, the average Silver plan premium offered to 27-year-old non-smokers was $289.
When we restrict the sample to include only the 20 least-expensive plans in each Rating-Area, the average premium offered to 50-year-old non-smokers drops to $446 (see Panel B of Table 2 ).
The legal maximum MOOP levels specified by CMS were $6350 in 2014, $6600 in 2015, $6850 in 2016, and $7150 in 2017. For plans included in the baseline dataset, average MOOPs for Catastrophic and Bronze plans were within 5% of the legal maximum each year from 2014-2017, while average MOOPs for Silver, Gold and Platinum plans were less than 72% of the legal limit in each year.
Key explanatory variable: NO_HRP
The key explanatory variable is the binary variable, NO_HRP, which is set equal to one if the state does not operate an HRP in a given year, and zero if it does. HRP closures typically occurred in phases, as states closed the pools to new enrollees, and then transitioned pool enrollees into other types of coverage including the HIX markets. We code HRPs as operating until enrollment was terminated for all categories of enrollees (see Table 3 ) 8 . Thus, the final closure only impacted a subset of the individuals enrolled in the pool prior to initiation of the closure process. This definition of HRP closure is conservative, in the sense that it minimizes the probability that we will observe a statistically significant impact of this variable on plan premiums and CS requirements. 
Independent variables to control for relevant factors
Plan premiums and CS requirements may be impacted by plan characteristics, competitive and regulatory variables that evolve over time, and baseline characteristics of states that remain relatively stable over time. We measure two plan characteristics. First, the variable NETWORK-ONLY indicates whether the plan covered any care delivered by out-of-network providers.
Among Silver plans, 53% are network-only plans that do not cover any out-of-network care.
Second, we define binary variables (HMO and PPO) to indicate whether each plan is structured as a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) or Preferred Provider Organization (PPO). These Table 2 ).
We utilize the number of insurers offering plans in each Rating-Area, during each year, to control for the degree of competition in the HIX market in each area. Several studies find a negative correlation between the number of insurers offering plans in the HIX market and the average premiums for those plans (Bennett, Smith and Norris 2015 , Blumberg, Holahan and Wengle 2016 , Dickstein et al., 2015 . The average number of insurers offering Silver plans in a Rating-Area was 4.7 in our sample (see Panel A2 of Table 2 ).
Two types of regulatory changes implemented during the 2014-2016 observation period could have impacted plan premiums. First, expansion of Medicaid eligibility could affect plan premiums by altering the risk profile of individuals buying coverage in the HIX markets (Antonisse et al., 2018) . Ellis, Esson and Frederick (2017) for example, conclude that Medicaid Expansion led to an 11% decrease in the average plan premium.
As detailed in 
Sample Definitions and Constant Trend Analysis
Sample Definitions
Our baseline sample includes all plans offered in the 50 states plus Washington, D.C., with four exceptions.
• First, the HIX Compare dataset (RWJF 2017) does not provide information about individual plans offered during 2014 for 15 states, and it does not provide this information during 2015 for two states. This data includes 139,194 plan-year observations for plans offered to 50-year-old non-smokers.
• Second, we exclude plans with monthly premiums less than $100 or greater than $1000, which excludes approximately 1.5% of plans for 50-year-old non-smokers and 1.1% of plans offered to 27-year-old non-smokers. This exclusion is based on the assumption that plan characteristics for plans with unusually high (or low) premiums must have been qualitatively different from the characteristics of the majority of plans, if all plans are priced to meet the MLR requirement. For the baseline sample of plans offered to 50-year-old non-smokers, 2,114 plans are dropped; hence the resulting sample size is 137,080. Approximately two-thirds of the dropped plans offered monthly premiums greater than $1000, while one-third offered premiums below $100.
• Third, we exclude states that implemented Medicaid expansion after 12/31/2013. This exclusion allows us to focus on the impacts of HRP closure without contamination from concurrent changes in risk profiles stemming from the expansion of Medicaid eligibility.
This exclusion reduces the number of states included in our primary dataset to 44, and it reduces the number of plans to 122,404. It also reduces the number of states that closed
HRPs during 2014 to eight.
• Finally, we exclude plan-years with missing data on premiums, CS requirements or plan characteristics. This reduces the sample to 95,368 plans. Table 3 ).
Bronze plans account for 31% of the plans included in the sample, Silver plans account for 32% of these plans, Gold plans account for 23% of the sample plans, and Platinum and Catastrophic plans account for the remaining 15% of plans in the baseline sample. However, Silver plans accounted for the majority of plans purchased. In 2016, for example, 71% of all plans purchased in federal-platform states were Silver plans, 21% were Bronze, and the remaining 8% were Gold, Platinum and Catastrophic plans (CMS 2016). Table 4 ). Table 4 ).
Parallel Trends
Results
We begin by using plan-level fixed effects (Plan-FE) to estimate the impacts of HRP closures on premiums, deductibles and MOOPs for plans offered in all metal categories. In the second step, we report additional results using State-level, Rating-Area-level and Insurer-by-RatingArea-level fixed effects. These regressions provide estimates of the impacts of HRP closures on premiums and CS requirements averaged over the full sets of plans offered within a state, after entry and exit of plans. Finally, we report several robustness checks, and we test whether the Plan-FE estimates are stable over time.
Impacts of HRP Closures on Premiums, Deductibles and MOOPs: Within-Plan Variation
We report Plan-FE estimates of the impacts of HRP closures on premiums, deductibles and
MOOPs for plans offered in each metal category in Table 5 Table 5 ). Multiplying the percentage increases by the average premium for Bronze and Silver plans, these estimates imply a $33.90 increase in the average monthly premium for Bronze plans and a $36.96 increase in the average monthly premium for Silver plans.
The magnitudes of the percentage increases in premiums are similar for 27-year-old nonsmokers (see Panel B of Table 5 ). HRP closure generates a smaller $22.68 increase in average monthly premiums for Silver plans offered to 27-year-old non-smoking adults, however, because the premiums for plans offered to the younger adults are lower than the premiums for plans offered to 50-year-old non-smokers.
HRP closures also generate large and significant increases in deductibles and MOOPs for
Silver plans with consistent plan-IDs. The Plan-FE estimates indicate that HRP closure led to a 41% increase in Deductibles, and a 24% increase in MOOPs.
However, the impacts on CS requirements for plans in other AV categories are small and either insignificant or negative. These results are consistent with expectations. While insurers were able to increase MOOPs for many Silver plans, the MOOP constraint specified by CMS limited insurer' ability to increase MOOPs for Bronze plans: the average MOOP exceeded 90% of the maximum legal MOOP for 96% of Bronze plans. The MOOP constraint also limited insurer' ability to raise deductibles for many Bronze plans: deductibles exceeded 90% the maximum legal MOOP for nearly half (47%) of the Bronze plans. Insurers offering Catastrophic plans faced similar constraints. These constraints were less likely to be binding for insurers offering Gold and Platinum plans; however, these plans may occupy a different market niche,
given that the central role of the second-lowest-priced Silver plans in the computation of the APTC and the fact that CSR payments are only available to individuals who purchase Silver plans.
Impacts of HRP Closures on Premiums, Deductibles and MOOPs: Within-Plan Variation
and Across-Plan Variation Table 6 provides estimates of the impacts of HRP closure on average premiums, deductibles and MOOPS for the sets of Silver plans available to consumers within a state or rating area, when these sets of plans are affected by plan entry and exit. The OLS results (column 1) indicate that closing an HRP is significantly associated with an increase in premiums, but the results for the cost-sharing variables are mixed (see Panel A of Table 6 ). Table 6 ).
In Panels B and C of Table 6 , we report results based on the alternate definitions of the comparison group. We report the results of OLS and FE regressions when the comparison group consists of states that "always" operated HRPs in Panel B, and we report results generated when the comparison group consists of states that "never" operated HRPs in Panel C. The results reported in Panel A of Table 6 are robust with respect to the composition of the set of comparison states, especially when we use Insurer-by-Rating-Area or Plan FE.
Comparison of the Plan-FE results with the results based on less-granular FE results provides indirect evidence on changes in plan generosity. Regulatory restrictions limit the degree to which insurers can adjust the generosity of a given plan; however, insurers can adjust the generosity of the set of plans offered within a geographic area by withdrawing relatively generous plans and offering new plans with less generous features. The fact that the Plan-FE coefficients are larger than the State-FE and Rating-Area-FE coefficients is consistent with the hypothesis that insurers reduced the generosity of the sets of plans offered within each State and Rating-Area.
Indirect Evidence of Impacts on Plan Generosity
We construct two more samples, to explore additional indirect evidence that insurers may have responded to HRP closures by reducing plan generosity. We begin by constructing a Table 7 ). Comparison of these results with those presented in Table   6 suggests that plan entry and exit accounts for the differences between the magnitudes of the coefficients estimated using State-level or Rating-Area-level FE and those estimated using Planlevel FE. One possible explanation for the impact of plan entry and exit, on the magnitude of the impact of HRP closure, focuses on the use of entry and exit as a mechanism for adjusting plan generosity. This result is consistent with the evidence reported by Bennett, Smith and Norris (2015) , indicating that plans offered at the high end of the market are qualitatively different from plans with lower premiums.
Robustness Checks
We test whether the results are sensitive to variations in the criteria for including states in the sample. We estimated the impacts of HRP closures on premiums when:
(i) the sample is restricted to states for which data is available in all four of the 2014-2017 years (Panel A of Table 8 ),
(ii) the sample is restricted to exclude unusual states 11 (Panel B of Table 8 ), and (iii) the sample is expanded to include states that expanded Medicaid after 1/1/2014 (Panel C of Table 8 ).
We conclude that the estimated impacts are not sensitive to these variations, although we report anomalous results for the Rating-Area-FE regressions in Panels B and C. 11 We drop six states from the baseline sample with unusual characteristics. New York mandated pure community rating prior to implementation of the HIX markets. Massachusetts implemented early comprehensive reforms in its state health insurance market. Washington DC and Vermont had high-income thresholds for Medicaid eligibility prior to passage of the ACA. Iowa and Arkansas implemented Medicaid expansion by using expansion funds to provide premium support for Medicaid-eligible adults in the HIX markets. Table 9 ).
The insignificant impacts generated by the 2016 closures could potentially reflect a change in insurer strategy, or they could reflect idiosyncratic characteristics of the two states that closed HRPs in that year or "noise" generated by closure of the temporary federal Risk Corridors and
Reinsurance programs at the end of 2016. 
Discussion and Conclusion
A small number of unusually high-cost individuals account for a substantial proportion of population healthcare expenditures. Therefore, policies that determine whether financial responsibility for costs incurred by the high-cost individuals will be located within the HIX markets, or shifted out of those markets, can substantially impact HIX plan premiums, costsharing requirements and generosity. States can shift this responsibility out of the HIX markets by continuing to operate pre-2014 HRPs or by opening new HRPs or reinsurance programs, and they can receive federal funds through Section 1332 waivers. States may give increasing attention to this policy option, as they face substantial premium increases for the 2019 plan year and concerns about HIX market stability (CBO, 2018). These results complement the actuarial predictions generated by simulation models. The simulation models account for idiosyncratic characteristics of state RSM designs, regulatory frameworks and competitive environments. These issues are important. For example,
Minnesota and Oregon plan to use ex-post identification of high-cost individuals, while Alaska plans to use the ex-ante strategy typically described as an 'invisible' HRP. Insurer responses to changes in RSM status could be sensitive to specific details associated with ex-ante vs. ex-post identification of high risk individuals, or details defining specifics mechanisms for shifting the financial risk. The simulation models do not, however, encompass the strategic component of insurer responses to changes in RSM strategy, when insurers select the mix of adjustments to plan premiums, cost-sharing requirements and generosity levels.
In contrast, the empirical results reported in this paper provide evidence on insurer responses to HRP closures that occurred in nine states during 2014-2016. These decisions were made in the context of specific state and federal regulatory requirements. While the empirical results provide estimates of the combination of premium and cost-sharing adjustments implemented by insurers, the available data imposes three limitations:
• The new RSMs created and operated under Section 1332 waivers are likely to differ from the state HRPs created prior to implementation of the HIX markets.
• Relevant state and federal regulations are continuously evolving. For example, the analysis presented in this paper relies on data from years in which insurance companies received federal Cost-Sharing Reduction payments. Impacts of termination of those payments on insurer strategies are not reflected in the estimates presented in this paper.
• The HIX Compare dataset (RWJF 2017) provides detailed information about plans offered in each Rating-Area during each year; however it does not provide information about plan market shares. Therefore, we estimate the impact of HRP-closures on average premiums for plans offered in the closure states, but we do not estimate average impacts on buyers.
